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residency barrier is actual and immediate. Because the judicial process is an
exclusive precondition to dissolution of marriage, the state should not be able
to monopolize the right to dissolve the marriage without affording all citizens
7 2
equal access to the divorce courts.
PATRICIA

A.

FREEMAN

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
THE EXPANSION OF EXEMPTION SIX
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974)
Wine Hobby USA, a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the mail order
sale of homemade winemaking equipment, requested the United States Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, to disclose the names and addresses of
persons registered with the Bureau to produce homemade wine. 2 Upon the
Bureau's denial of the request, Wine Hobby sued in federal district court for
a disclosure order. 3 The court granted the order requiring the Bureau to release the desired names and addresses. 4 On appeal,5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and HELD, unless some public interest
is advanced, any disclosure of personal information that will result in an invasion of privacy is not compelled under the Freedom of Information Act.,
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA),7 replaced the Public
72.

See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).

1. The Bureau was established by Treasury Order No. 221 on July 1, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg.
11696 (1972).
2. Persons who produce wine are subject to certain permit, tax, and bonding requirements under 26 U.S.C. §§5041(a), (d), 5043(a), (b) 1970, and 27 U.S.C. 203(b)(1) (1970). An
exception to these requirements is provided by statute for any registered head of a family
that produces for family use and not for sale an amount of wine not exceeding 200 gallons
per year. 26 U.S.C. §5042(a)(2) (1970). Wine Hobby stipulated in the district court that its
purpose in obtaining the names and addresses of the wine permit registrants was to enable
it to forward catalogs and announcements to these people regarding equipment it offered
for sale. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 134 (3d Cir. 1974).
3. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(3) (1970) gives those whose requests for government information have
been denied the right to appeal to federal district courts for orders forcing disclosure of the
desired information.
4. Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363
F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
5. Appellee neither submitted briefs nor participated in oral argument. 502 F.2d at 154.
6. 502 F.2d 133.
7. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1970). Commentary on the Act, which became effective on July 4, 1967,
has been extensive. The most comprehensive bibliography is in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
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Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA). This
section of the APA had been intended to provide a statutory framework that
would permit broad public access to government information.9 Through a
course of restrictive agency interpretation of the law's provisions,1 however,
the Public Information section "came to be looked upon more as a withholding
statute than a disclousre statute."" The FOIA was enacted to remedy the deficiencies of the previous law. In order to accomplish this goal, the FOIA (1)
eliminated the APA's requirement that those seeking information held by the
Government be "properly and directly concerned," (2) exempted nine specifically defined categories of information from disclosure, and (3) provided those
who had been denied access to nonexempt information the right to appeal to
federal district courts for disclosure orders.' 2 The instant case turned on an
interpretation of one of the nine exemptions, Exemption Six, which allows
agencies to withhold "personnel, medical, or similar files the disclosure of
3
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'
Congressional testimony indicates that, prior to its adoption,'4 Exemption
Six' 5 was interpreted by federal agencies to protect only the privacy of government employees.' 6 This interpretation was changed, however, by a report of the
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 93D CONG.,
2D SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CAsES, ARTICLES

(Comm. Print 1974). Much of the response has been critical. See, e.g., Davis, The Information
Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CH. L. Ray. 761, 807 (1967): "That the Congress of the
United States after more than ten years of hearings, questionnaires, studies, reports, drafts,
and pulling and hauling, should wind up with such a shabby product seems discouraging."
Katz, The Gaines Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act,
48 TEXAs L. REv. 1261, 1262 (1970): "After three years of operation, the Freedom of In-

formation Act has not fulfilled its advocates' most modest aspirations."
8. 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1946).
9. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
10. The National Science Foundation, for example, cited the Public Information section
in refusing to divulge cost estimates of unsuccessful contractors in connection wth a deep
sea study. In addition, the Navy found support in the law to withhold telephone directories
and the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors used the section to refuse to disclose
their votes on issues involving controversial expenditures. Id. at 5, 6.
11. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)...
12. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 9,.at 1, 2.
13. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (1970).
14. Exemption Six was not included in the draft of the FOIA considered in 1963. Hearings on S. 166, S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. at 1, 2 (1964). The drafters evidently
believed that personnel, medical, and similar files were already barred from disclosure by
statute. S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1964). In 1964 the exemption was added.
Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1966). In 1965 the wording was
changed from "similar matters" to the present "similar files." Hearings on S. 1160 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7 (1965).
15.

The exemption refers to an invasion of privacy, a familiar concept in tort law. An

actionable invasion of privacy in tort requires a public disclosure of private facts concerning
a matter "offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities." W. PRosS, HANDooK OF Tim LAw OF TORTs 811 (4th ed. 1971).
16. Mr. John A. McCart of the Government Employees' Council, AFL-CIO, indicated
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Senate Judiciary Committee. 7 The report acknowledged that many government agencies, in the course of performing their functions, were required to
maintain files containing detailed information about citizens.' 8 The report
made clear that the statutory language of Exemption Six was broad enough to
permit these agencies to withhold the personnel, medical, and similar files of
all citizens and not just the files of those employed by the Government. 9
The significance of the holding in the instant case lies in the additional
breadth it gives to Exemption Six. The court utilized two tests to arrive at its
decision. The first test was used to determine whether the names and addresses
sought by Wine Hobby constituted "personnel, medical, or similar files" within
the meaning of Exemption Six.20 The court reasoned that because the element
shared by personnel and medical files was the personal quality of the information contained, the test for determining whether information was a "similar
file" should turn on whether the information is personal. 21 The court then,
without elaborating, found that names and addresses were personal information and therefore within the language of Exemption Six.22
This personal information test allows Exemption Six to prohibit the disclosure of a broader range of information than that which had been prohibited by the tests articulated in previous cases. In Washington Research
Project v. HEW,2 3 the court held that the test for determining whether competency ratings were "personnel, medical, or similar files" turned on whether
the ratings were detailed government records. - 1 This test had its roots in a
House committee report, which stated that Exemption Six was designed to
"cover detailed Government records on an individual."'2 5 The court found
that because the competency ratings were brief and nonspecific, they did not
6
constitute "similar files" under the exemption.2
that Exemption Six was a needed exemption but thought employees themselves should have

access to their files. Mr. Robert Giles of the Commerce Department submitted a letter
interpreting the exemption to permit release of the files of nonemployee Patent Office attorneys. In defining some of the personnel records the disclosure of which would be effected
by the FOIA, the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information

listed efficiency ratings, physical examinations, aptitude test results, character evaluations, et
cetera. No mention was made of personal information held by the Government concerning
nongovernment employees. Hearings on H.R. 5012 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Opera-

tions and Government Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 162, 212, 265 (1965).
17. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
18. Id. The Veterans Administration and the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare were cited as examples of agencies likely to have large amounts of personal data on
file.
19. Id. The report stated Exemption Six "should lend itself particularly to those Government agencies where persons are required to submit vast amounts of personal data usually
for limited purposes." Id.
20. 502 F.2d at 135.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 366 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1973).
24. Id. at 937.
25. Hl.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 9, at 11.
26.

366 F. Supp. at 937.
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In Robles v. EPA27 and Rural Housing Alliance v. USDA2S the courts
focused on the question of whether the desired information contained intimate
details about an individual's personal life. This "intimate details" test also had
its origin in the committee report, which indicated that Exemption Six was
intended to prevent disclosure of files containing intimate details of the sort
that "might harm an individual." 29 This test was found not to have been met
in Robles where the court determined that because radiation levels of buildings pertained to physical things and not to human beings, the information
was not the sort of personally intimate detail designed to fall within Exemption Six.30 In Rural Housing, however, the court found that because disclosure
of facts pertaining to family fights, alcohol consumption, and the legitimacy of
children would be embarrassing, such information was sufficiently intimate to
fall within the similar files provision of Exemption Six. 3 '
The instant court did not attempt to distinguish the personal information
test from either the detailed records test or intimate details test. Rather, the
court reasoned that because the purpose of the exemption was to prevent invasions of privacy, the phrase "personnel, medical, or similar files" should be
expanded to include information the release of which would frustrate this
purpose, regardless of whether the information could be strictly construed as
being similar to that contained in personnel or medical files.3 2 Such a view of
Exemption Six suggests that in determining whether information falls within
the exemption, emphasis should be placed not on the phrase "personnel,
medical, or similar files," but on the phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy."
The second test applied by the instant court dealt with the meaning of the
words "dearly unwarranted." 33 The court held that the test for determining
when a disclosure was clearly unwarranted centered on the question of
whether the information would be used to advance a public interest that outweighs the affected individual's interest in privacy. 34 Although the term
"public interest" was never defined, the court asserted three reasons for balancing it against personal privacy. The first reason was that the word "unwarranted," in itself, connoted a balancing of factors3 5 Second, the idea of interest balancing by the judiciary was supported by Exemption Six's legislative
history.30 The court cited a Senate report, which stated that the exemption
27.
28.
29.
30.

484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
H.R. RE'. No. 1497, supra note 9, at 11.
484 F2d at 845.

31. 498 F.2d at 77.
32. 502 F.2d at 135. This justification was also used to permit lists of names and addresses
to fall under the statutory term "files." The court noted: "Were purchasers of contraceptives
required to register with the Government, and were a plaintiff to request disclosure of the
names and addresses of such registrants, a narrow construction of 'files' would require disclosure by preventing inquiry into the invasion of privacy which would result from disclosure." Id. n.9.

33. Id. at 135, 136.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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"enunciates a policy that will involve balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny and
' 37
the preservation of the public's right to government information." The third
justification was that nothing in the FOA precluded the selective disclosure of
38
information that could result from the application of a balancing test.
Seeking to follow the intent of Congress, the court applied the test to the
facts of the instant case by balancing the public interest that would be served
by the disclosure of the list against the invasion of personal privacy that such
disclosure would entail. The court noted that Wine Hobby intended to use the
names and addresses in an advertising mailing list. This use "advanced no
direct or indirect public interest" and its commercial nature was "wholly un39
related to the purpose behind the Freedom of Information Act." In addition,
the court noted that by releasing the names and addresses the Bureau would
also divulge the facts that those on the lists were winemakers and heads of
households and would potentially subject them to the receipt of unrequested
mail. 40 Thus, no public purpose would be served by disclosure, and the privacy

of individuals would be invaded to some extent. Balancing the admittedly
minor invasion of privacy against the complete absence of public interest, the
court held in favor of privacy and concluded that disclosure was clearly un41
warranted.
37. Id. at 136, n.9 quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 17. However, H.R. REP. No. 1497,
supra note 9, at 11, states that Exemption Six "provides a proper balance" between the
various rights involved. This language implies that Congress has already balanced the public
interest in disclosure against personal privacy and decided to permit all disclosure except that
which would be clearly unwarranted. Such an interpretation of Exemption Six does not support further judicial balancing of the interests previously balanced by Congress.
38. 502 F.2d at 136. This reading of the FOIA was made possible by subsection (b), which
indicates that nothing said in subsection (a), including the requirement that information be
made available to "any person," is applicable to information exempted from disclosure. From
this logical proposition, however, the court apparently assumed that because all seekers could
not have access to exempt information, by implication some seekers could have access. This
interpretation, which sanctions selective disclosure of exempt information, does violence to
the concept of exemption. Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee states that "all materials are to be made available to the public unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by
one of the exemptions." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 17, at 10. This statement implies that
Congress intended government information to be either absolutely exempt or public -not
selectively nonexempt for those who satisfy a judicially approved balancing test.
39. 502 F.2d at 137. The purposes of the FOIA have been variously stated. See, e.g., H.R.
REP'. No. 1497, supra note 4, at 12: "A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent
electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies. [The FOIA] provides the necessary machinery to assure the availability of
Government information necessary to an informed electorate." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 17,
at 3. The FOIA prevents the continued secrecy of "embarrassing mistakes or irregularities."
112 CONG. REc. 13016 (1966) (remarks of Congressman Reid): "The right of the public to
information is paramount and each generation must uphold anew that which sustains a free
press." 110 CONG. REC. 170 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey): "[E]very Senator knows
that certain agencies through the years have abused in a most flagrant manner the legitimate
right to withhold certain privileged or confidential information. The time for a thorough
revision ...is long overdue."
40. 502 F.2d at 137.
41. Id. The court said: "[W]e conclude that the invasion of privacy caused by disclosure
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In support of its use of the balancing test 2 the instant court cited Getman
v. NLRB. 43 In Getman the court disclosed the names and addresses of those
eligible to vote in certain union elections to labor law professors who were
preparing a study on election practices. The court, citing the legislative history
referred to in the instant case, concluded that disclosure would be warranted
where the public interest purpose of the researchers and the public need for
the study outweighed the slight invasion of privacy that would be suffered by
the union members.44 Thus, in Getman the public interest purpose of the researchers was a positive factor influencing the court in ordering disclosure. In
the instant case, however, lack of public interest purpose was a negative factor
that influenced the court in denying disclosure.
Prior to the holding in the instant case, the Getman balancing test had not
been accepted by other courts. The Fourth Circuit, in Robles4 repudiated the
test and held "that disclosure was never to 'depend upon the interest or lack
of interest of the party seeking disclosure.' "148 The Robles court believed that
the FOIA's general requirement that disclosure be. made to "any person"
evidenced an intent to prohibit inquiry into the purposes behind disclosure
requests 7 Thus, in Robles the court focused on the extent of the privacy invasion, not the public interest served by disclosure, in order to determine
whether disclosure was dearly unwarranted.
The Second Circuit, in Rose v. Department of the Air Force,48 also rejected the Getman balancing approach and held that in determining whether
disclosure was dearly unwarranted, it was necessary to look "into the nature of
the privacy interest invaded and the extent of the proposed invasion." 49 The
would be 'clearly unwarranted' even though the invasion of privacy in this case is not as
serious as that considered by-the court-in other cases...
42. This balancing test was criticized in Note, Invasion of Privacy and the. Freedom of
Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GaEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 527 (1972). "The benignly.discriminate approach of the Getman court may, in future cases, yield invidiously discriminate
withholding of records reminiscent of the approach under the predecessor statute." Id. at 536.
43. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
44. Id. at 677. The court acknowledged that the study had been in operation for two
years and was being financed by the largest grant ever made available, for law-related research, by the National Science Foundation. Id. at 676. A successful study, according to the
court, would serve as a model to encourage further empirical work to test the behavioral
assumptions underlying law. Id. at 677. The court noted "the public interest need for such
an empirical investigation ... has for some time been recognized by labor law scholars.....
Id. at 675-76. The court did not specifically define the term "public interest" but appears to
have equated it with scholarly research. This interest was contrasted with the "relatively
minor" loss of privacy that would result from an employee's being asked over the telephone
if he would be willing to be interviewed. Id. at 675.

45. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 847. The court quoted from Davis, supra note 7, at 766, who reads the exemption to require disclosure without regard to use but advocates amending the FOIA to
provide for disclosure on a selective basis.
47. Id. The court was referring to 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(3). This section requires that "on
request for identifiable records" the agency "shall make the records promptly available to
any person."
48. 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974).
49. Id. at 266.
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court emphasized that its test centered on the potential for serious harm that
might result from disclosure. 50 Thus, both the Fourth and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeals have interpreted "clearly unwarranted" to require investigation into the invasion of privacy itself and not into the reason for invasion.
In contrast, the court in the instant case examined not only the invasion of
privacy, but also the use to which the information would be put. By requiring
that this use advance a public interest, this approach can permit nondisclosure in cases where the invasion of privacy itself is insignificant. In addition, the court's approach requires at least an implicit judicial determination
of what constitutes "public interest." Most importantly, however, by insisting
on a showing of public interest, the instant decision makes it possible for an
agency to prohibit disclosure of information to commercial organizations while
simultaneously allowing disclosure to public interest concerns, even where the
invasion of privacy is exactly the same. Because no agency can ever know
whether desired information will be used strictly in the public interest, information would appear to be rightfully withheld whenever disclosure will result
51
in any invasion of privacy.
Both of the tests applied by the instant court, the personal information test
and the public interest balancing test, broaden the scope that Exemption Six
had acquired through prior judicial interpretation, and may permit agencies
to withhold greater amounts of information. The personal information test
broadens the statutory phrase "personnel, medical, and similar files" to encompass all personal information. The public interest balancing test broadens
the statutory phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" to encompass any invasion of privacy not serving a public interest. The joint application of these tests produces an exemption that bars disclosure of all personal information that will result in invasion of privacy unless disclosure advances a public interest.
An exemption of this sort may be necessary in order to keep the FOIA
from being exploited as a source of business information for private commercial interests. 52 To allow Exemption Six to be read this broadly, however,
threatens the FOIA's ultimate goal of public access to government information.
The prior disclosure law lost its effectiveness through precisely this sort of
broad interpretation. 53 The courts should look to past experience for guidance
and construe Exemption Six narrowly so as to effectuate, rather than thwart,

50. Id. at 267.
51. See Note, supra note 42, at 539.
52. Such an exemption might also be needed to curtail collection agency requests. Using
Exemption Six, the Immigration and Naturalization Service denies requests of collection
agencies for names and addresses of aliens in the United States. Hearings on United States
Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the
Freedom of Information Act (Part 4) Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
1176 (1972).
53. See note 10 supra.
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